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Negligence - Substantial Factor Test
While it is the right of the press ... to freely criticize and comment
upon the official action and conduct of a public officer, false and de-
famatory words ... are not privileged on the ground that they related
to a matter of public interest, and were spoken or published in good
faith.'7
Since Sullivan, of course, this is no longer either the majority or Ohio
position.
After the Sullivan case, good faith is a defense to a libel action and
malice cannot be inferred from the falsity of the statement - it must be
proved by the plaintiff to have actually existed in the mind of the critic
at the time the statement was printed.
What effect this decision will have upon the attitude of the country's
newspapermen remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Sullivan should provide
sufficient safeguards to enable an even wider and more open presentation
of events and issues by responsible reporters and columnists. The bene-
ficiaries of this decision are the American public.
Hence, the Sullivan case has, in effect, imposed upon all American
jurisdictions, via the first amendment, the view formerly espoused by only
eight states. As to these states, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 has had
little or no effect. Also, it no longer matters whether a distinction is
drawn between fair comment and qualified privilege. Justice Holmes'
distinction has been laid to rest in a graveyard of brilliance."
AND1EW M. FIsHmA N
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
Springsteel v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 192 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1963).*
The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor hired to dig a trench on
defendant's premises, alleged severe personal injuries while assisting in the
operation of a trench-digging machine. In lifting the boom of the ma-
chine to unload the bucket, the operator contacted overhead electric wires,
exerting upward force on the connecting steel posts. After engaging the
wires ten to fifteen times, one of the posts broke off, striking the plaintiff.
17. Ibid. (Emphasis added.) The earliest Ohio case on the subject is Seely v. Blair, Wright
358 (Ohio 1833), wherein the defendant stated publicly that plaintiff, a candidate for
county sheriff, was a liar and had perjured himself. The accusations were false and plaintiff
recovered a judgment. The case is cited for the proposition that the right of free comment
with reference to public officials does not extend to misstatements of fact. In this case, how-
ever, defendant was malicious and so the proposition loses much of its force with respect to
the changes that Sullivan will bring.
18. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
19. Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891).
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The plaintiff alleged that the defendant landowner had been negli-
gent in failing to properly maintain the post in that it had been weakened
by rust and corrosion. Defendant, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,
claimed that the acts of the subcontractor's machine operator constituted
intervening negligence.' Further, the defendant alleged that the sub-
contractor had been warned against touching any wires on the premises.
The issue at trial was: whether defendant's failure to properly maintain
the post and the negligent action of the machine operator were concurring
causes of the plaintiff's injuries; or, on the other hand, whether the negli-
gent action of the machine operator was a superseding cause.2 This issue
was in turn resolved into the pivotal question of whether the negligence
of the defendant in failing to maintain the post in a safe condition was a
substantial factor' in the injury to the plaintiff.4
At trial, the jury returned a verdict against the defendant landowner,
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, in the sum of $135,000. On review,
the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the lower court for failure
to give instructions on third party negligence. However, the court went
on to hold that
if the original negligence continues to the time of injury and con-
tributes substantially thereto in conjunction with the intervening act,
each [negligent act] may be the proximate concurring cause for which
full liability may be imposed.5
The instant case resolves three interrelated points of law: (1) judicial
recognition of the doctrine of substantial factor, (2) resolution of the
foreseeability requirement in relation to the doctrine of substantial factor,
and (3) assignment of the decision-making power on the issue of sub-
stantiality to the jury.
With respect to the first point, the Springsteel case is unique in that
* Motion to certify overruled, 37 OHIO BAR 534 (Ohio Sup. Ct. 1964).
1. "An intervening cause is one which comes into active operation in producing the result
after the negligence of the defendant. 'Intervening' is used in a time sense; it refers to later
events." PROSSER, TORTS § 49, at 266 (2d ed. 1955). (Emphasis added.)
2. "A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention
prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is
a substantial factor in bringing about." REsTATEMENT, TORTs § 440 (1934).
3. All definitions of causation suffer difficulties in clear and simple expression. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court has defined substantial factor by relating it to proximate cause as follows:
'An instruction on proximate cause would be proper which informs the jury that by proximate
cause, legal cause, or cause ... is meant such efficient cause of the accident as to lead the
jurors, as reasonable men and women, to conclude that the negligence of [defendant) was a
substantial factor in causing the injury." Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis.
229, 236-37, 55 N.W.2d 29, 33 (1952).
4. Springsteel v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 192 N.E.2d 81, 86-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
5. Id. at 86. However, judgment for plaintiff was reversed, and the case was remanded for
a new trial on the ground that the trial court refused to give a requested instruction to the
jury on third party negligence.
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it recognizes the doctrine of substantial factor6 within the framework of
legal causation wherein the second actor's part is an independent' interven-
ing force. Prior to the instant case, the principle of substantial factor was
recognized, for the most part, only where the second actor's part was a
dependent' intervening force.' Moreover, causation in Ohio negligence
law was traditionally tested in terms of whether the plaintiff's injuries
were the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negli-
gence.1" The substantial factor test, however, supplants the natural and
probable consequences test. Now, where the injury is the result of con-
current causation, full liability may be imposed on the defendant if his
conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's injury. 1
The second point discussed in the instant case involves the issue of
foreseeability. The question was whether the landowner should have an-
ticipated the negligent act of the machine operator. Traditionally, the
test for deciding whether an intervening act absolves the original tort-
6. The principal of substantial factor is not, however, a new concept in American negligence
jurisprudence. See Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv. 103, 303 (1912).
The American Law Institute adopted substantial factor as the keystone test for legal cause
in 1934. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 431-35 (1934). Since then, at least fifteen states
have recognized the doctrine of substantial factor. See Herzberg v. White, 49 Ariz. 313, 66
P.2d 253 (1937); Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 %Cal. App. 2d 418, 218 P.2d 43
(1950); Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 At. 762 (1929); Mitchell v. Branch, 45
Hawaii 128, 363 P.2d 969 (1961); Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Wilson, 226 Ind. 1, 77
NXE.2d 580 (1948); Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
137 So. 2d 298 (1962); Johnson v. Evanski, 221 Minn. 323, 22 N.W. 2d 213 (1946);
Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Maxfield v. Maxfield, 102 N.H.
101, 151 A.2d 226 (1959); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Simon
v. Hudson Coal Co., 350 Pa. 82, 38 A.2d 259 (1944); Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App.
55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954); Parks v. Hines, 314 S.W.2d 431 (Texas Civ. App. 1958);
Weaver v. McClintock-Trunkey Co., 8 Wash. 2d 154, 111 P.2d 570 (1941); Pfeifer v. Standard
Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952).
For an especially tragic fact situation exemplifying concurrent tortfeasors held jointly
liable based on the substantial factor test, see Levin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 201 F.
Supp. 791 (W.D. Pa. 1962). See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 20.6, at 1159-60 nA5
(1956), for a criticism of the doctrine of substantial factor as a legal versus factual test for
legal cause. The substantial factor doctrine has also been criticized as not providing an ade-
quate safeguard for imposing liability. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra at 1158-61;
MoRus, TORTS 163, 187-88 (1953).
7. It is important to note the distinction between an "independent intervening cause" and
a "dependent intervening cause." An "independent intervening cause" is one which operates
without respect to defendant's cause; a "dependent intervening cause" is one which is caused
by the tortfeasor's original act. Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 418, 425,
218 P.2d 43, 48 (1950).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. See Garbe v. Halloran, 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N.E.2d 217 (1948); Community Traction
Co. v. Freeman, 116 Ohio St. 448, 156 N.E.2d 598 (1927). See generally 39 OmIo JuR. 2d
Negligence § 33 (1959).
10. See 39 OMo JtR. 2d Negligence § 29 (1959).
11. In GREEN, JUDGE & JURY 230 (1930), the author explains the principle of substantial
factor as follows: "In the absence of wrongful conduct on the plaintiff's part, the inquiry as to
causes should end as soon as it appears that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor."
GREEN, op. cit. supra at 230. (Emphasis added.) See also Prosser, The Minnesota Court on
Proximate Cause, 21 MmN. L. REv. 19 (1936).
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feasor of liability is whether the consequences ought to have been fore-
seen under the circumstances.12 However, in the instant case, the court,
relying on the Restatement of Torts,"3 stated:
[T]he law does not inevitably require that in order to prevent an inter-
vening act from being a superseding cause which will relieve defendant
of responsibility for its negligence, that the precise act be foreseeable.14
Clearly, this holding liberalizes the test of foreseeabiity with respect to
concurrent third party negligence. Therefore, greater vigilance will now
be required of landowners to correct latent defects on their premises.
The third point in the Springsteel case involves the question of sepa-
ration of functions between judge and jury. The question was whether
the judge or the jury ought to decide whether the third party's interven-
ing act was a concurrent cause of the injury, and if so whether such an
act constituted a superseding cause. In Springsteel, the court concludes
that
whether an intervening act is a concurrent cause or a superseding cause
of injury presents a question of fact for the triers of fact, the jury.15
This position finds support in the Restatement of Torts which grants
the jury the power of deciding issues where reasonable judicial minds
could differ as to a defendant's liability.' 6 On the other hand, the dissent-
ing opinion in Springsteel7 would have allowed the trial court to grant
a directed verdict for the defendant by what is essentially a "but for" test. 8
These two positions exemplify a controversial area in the law of torts -
the division of decisional powers between the judge and the jury."9 The
instant case resolves this question in favor of the jury.
In summarizing these three principles in their application to the instant
case, it can be concluded: ( 1 ) that the latent defect in the post was a sub-
12. See 39 OHIo Jul. 2D Negligence § 30 (1959). But see 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 1159, wherein the author states: "... [A]s we have seen, foreseeability has no
place at all in solving the cause-in-fact problem. Rather, it represents a limitation which would
relieve a defendant, for reasons of policy, from liability for harm which he in fact caused."
13. RESTATEMENT, SUPPLEMENT (TORTS) § 435 (1948).
14. Springsteel v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 192 N.E.2d 81, 86 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
15. Id. at 87.
16. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 434 (1934).
17. 192 N.E.2d 81, 91 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963), (dissenting opinion).
18. The "but for" test may be stated as follows: the tortfeasor's "conduct is not a cause of
the event if the event would have occurred without it." PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at 220 (2d ed.
1955). In Springsteel, the dissenting opinion stated: "It is crystal dear from all circum-
stances in this case that had the pole not been subjected ... to this whipping action, the acci-
dent would not have taken place ...." 192 N.E.2d 81, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). In other
words, the dissenting opinion would have held for the defendant on the theory that "but for"
the conduct of the machine operator, the plaintiff would not have been injured. It is im-
portant to note, however, that the "but for" test is not universally valid as an exclusionary
rule. 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. Cit. supra note 6, at 1110.
19. See Prosser, SELECTED ToPIcs ON THE LAw oF TORTS 240 (1954); Prosser, Palsgrat
Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 31 (1953).
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stantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury; (2) that the defendant cannot
prevail under the substantial factor test by asserting that the event was
unforeseeable, notwithstanding the fact that in prior Ohio cases involving
concurrent negligence, a showing of lack of foreseeability under the cir-
cumstances might have been sufficient to relieve the defendant of liability;
and (3) that the question of whether the negligent acts of the subcon-
tractor's operator, or the latent defect in the post was a substantial factor
in causing plaintiff's injuries is a question for the jury as opposed to one
to be determined by the judge.
In concluding, it is clear that the effect of this decision is to enlarge
a plaintiffs' remedies under Ohio negligence law. Asking a jury to decide
whether a defendant's negligence is a substantial factor in a plaintiff's in-
jury is a direct proposition. It must thus be concluded that Springsteel
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.2" is an important milestone in the growth
of Ohio tort law.
RUSSELL B. MAMONE
20. 192 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
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